Sandel, M., The Case
Against Perfection: Ethics in the age of bioengineering. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 2007. Loc 349
As humanity’s collective efforts in
technology and medicine continue to advance at an exponential rate,[1]
individuals are presented with an ever-increasing pallet of options to meet
their needs. A woman who may be presented with a health risk as a result of
pregnancy is able to control her fertility through the use of contraceptives.[2] A man
whose waning organ function is likely to cause his death may rely on his
brother’s generosity and good health to offer him a chance of survival.[3] A
child who has a genetic disposition to a neurodegenerative disease has the
opportunity of undergoing an MRI[4] to
identify potential symptoms in order to facilitate early treatment.[5] These
developments serve to remind us that we are fortunate to live in an age in
which many of the threats to our eudaimonia can be combatted. However, such
medical advances do not come without their own set of moral quandaries. Recently,
the UK voted in favour[6] of
a procedure that will allow doctors to transfer the mitochondrial DNA from one
woman into the egg of another, effectively creating a baby with three parents.[7] Critics
of this process are concerned that the consequences of such genetic engineering
will lead to a dystopian society in which parents are free to select their
children’s traits and characteristics.[8] The
deliberate modification of an organism – for the purposes of this essay, children
– through the alteration of its genetic code[9] are
often referred to as ‘designer children.’ The aim of this essay is
to consider the philosophical works of Michael Sandel and John Stuart Mill in determining
how the position of each thinker would engage with the question of parental
selection of infant characteristics through technological means. In doing so, focus
will be placed on autonomy and prevention of disease.
We live in an age where the possibility
of designer babies is no longer HG Wells territory.[10] Parents
may soon be allowed to select certain desired qualities of their child, such as
eye colour, intelligence, and athletic ability, pre-birth.[11] According
to Sandel, this possibility means that we are faced with a promise and a
predicament; on the one hand, our increasing knowledge and awareness will
enable us to prevent a host of debilitating diseases. On the other, it will
enable us to manipulate our own nature.[12] One
argument in favour of biological enhancement is the ‘chance’ argument. This
line of reasoning concludes that as humanity is now on the verge of possessing the
authoritative tool of dictating its nature, a failure to utilise it would
result in a moral culpability for the results of the natural lottery.[13] In
his book, ‘The Case Against Perfection,’ Sandel submits a number of arguments against this position. For him, this ‘moral vertigo’[14] requires
an analysis of the fundamental reasons how such practices diminish our
humanity.[15]
Perhaps his most prominent argument is that of the ‘openness to the unbidden.’[16] What
is being questioned here is the nature of the mentality possessed by the
designing parents, in particular their quest to master the mystery of birth. Sandel
suggests that such a prospect will disfigure the relationship between parent
and child, depriving the parent of the humility and sympathies which follow the
sincerity of embracing what nature chooses to give us.[17]
This argument makes sense insofar as it is accepted that the perceived benefits
outweigh those so perceived by the designing parents. What an ‘openness to the
unbidden’ may cultivate for one may of equal magnitude impede for another. Are
we to value the ‘mystery of life’ to an extent that we sacrifice our ability to
live what Aristotle described as the ‘good life’?[18]
It appears, then, that these two notions of life are irreconcilable in this
context. One might consider what allows Sandel the moral certainty to
suggest that those who partake in selecting their children’s characteristics
are missing out on what it really means to be a parent? Would it not be more
suitable to make a comparison between the parents who ‘do’ and those who
‘don’t’? Instead, Sandel remarks in a very sweeping nature that those who ‘do’
are conclusively at fault, and, by implication, suggests that those who do not
bear children possess only a deficient sense of reality, for they cannot
appreciate the unbidden at all.[19]
For Mill, “human nature is not a
machine to be built after a model, set to do exactly the work prescribed for
it…but a tree, which requires to grow and develop…according to the tendency of
the inward forces which make it a living thing.”[20] Such
a description instinctively stands in the way of manipulation.
However, it is unclear how far this argument can be taken given the many other
ways in which parents can seek to influence their children’s lives. In any
case, it may then be said that Mill and Sandel are in congruence on the matter;
both thinkers appear to consider the designating and paving of the life of
one’s child to be disagreeable. It is submitted that, for both, there exists an
inherent importance on the uncertainties and experiences which will befall us
throughout our lives, and – for better or worse – these are to be attributed
greater value than the benefits which may befall us following someone else’s
imposition of will or desire.
This leads to the argument concerning
autonomy, which is said to be the liberty of any human being to have personal
independence and freedom from external influence. Naturally, and irrespective
of the stage of development, any influence over an unborn child will be
contrary to its autonomy. The key question here is whether
parents are bestowed an intrinsic right over the lives of their children, and,
if so, whether that right usurps their children’s right to independence? Those
who answer in the affirmative claim that genetic alteration, like music lessons
or private tuition, is in the child’s best interests.
Sandel is not persuaded by the autonomy argument for he considers it to bear false implications. He argues that, absent a designer parent, children would not be free to choose their physical characteristics for themselves.[21] Autonomy is not to be disregarded entirely, however, for there exists what Jürgen Habermas argues to be a violation of the children’s right to be the ‘sole authors of their own life history.’[22] Sandel subscribes to this argument, and further adds that even if no prima facie harm is inflicted on the child’s autonomy, the process is eerily similar to eugenics.[23] Thus, what he labels ‘eugenic parenting’ is immoral due to its entrenchment of a stance of mastery and dominance toward the world – hence omitting the appreciation of the gifted character of human achievement.[24]
Sandel is not persuaded by the autonomy argument for he considers it to bear false implications. He argues that, absent a designer parent, children would not be free to choose their physical characteristics for themselves.[21] Autonomy is not to be disregarded entirely, however, for there exists what Jürgen Habermas argues to be a violation of the children’s right to be the ‘sole authors of their own life history.’[22] Sandel subscribes to this argument, and further adds that even if no prima facie harm is inflicted on the child’s autonomy, the process is eerily similar to eugenics.[23] Thus, what he labels ‘eugenic parenting’ is immoral due to its entrenchment of a stance of mastery and dominance toward the world – hence omitting the appreciation of the gifted character of human achievement.[24]
Mill believes it imperative for
individuality to be allowed to thrive. If genetic engineering became a
normative procedure amongst expectant couples it would lead to what he depicts
as the ‘wearing down into uniformity all that is individual’ in ourselves as a
species.[25]
Without the differences bought about by the natural lottery, we will - of our
own accord - forever be prohibited from allowing humankind to be noble and
beautiful objects of contemplation.[26] Consequently,
any pre-birth intrusion would immediately deny the child the unhindered right
to lay out her own path in life. Mill’s position is that everyone ought
to have this right. Not necessarily because it is the ‘best’ path, but by
virtue of it being her own chosen
path.[27]
This idea has limited application in reality. For example, would any difference
exist between a murderer who kills for personal gratification and one who does
so as a consequence of his gang affiliations? In both cases, the killer is the
one conducting the killing. Legally, and perhaps morally, there would not be
any leeway granted to the first killer merely by way of him acting according to
his own ‘chosen path,’ any more so granted to the second killer simply because
he was instructed to do so.
The next issue to be addressed is that
of genetic engineering for medical purposes. The key question here is whether
the idea of designer children is still disagreeable if the only thing being
designed is a tackling of the child’s predisposition to disease? Efforts
to prevent disease before birth (instead of treating it afterwards) have been
described as ‘noble.’[28]
They consist of PGD[29]
whereby a six or eight-cell embryo is screened for genetic disease. Following
the removal of the unwanted cells, the embryo is then implanted into the
mother’s womb.[30]
Some see this controversial procedure as an ‘unimaginable power,’ capable of
altering the course of our humanity.[31] Conversely,
would this process remain as morally divisive if it did not involve medical
intervention? For example, would it be questionable for a mother to stand on
her head during copulation, if, by way of some biological phenomenon, it
significantly increased her chances of giving birth to a blond child?[32] It
is conceivable that such practice would receive far less criticism. Moreover, those
who cannot afford PGD often choose abortion upon prenatal discovery of their
child’s unwanted condition.[33] A
further question is raised when the unwanted condition is something that does
not obviously meet that definition. In other words, is ‘culling the herd’ necessary
if we are dealing with an unwanted sex, eye colour, or lower intelligence?[34] It
has been argued that processes like PGD and abortion on the basis of disability
or illness are fundamentally counterproductive due to their perennial societal effects.
Members of disadvantaged communities[35] have
long endured a struggle of inclusion, and to find their numbers dwindling
serves only to reinforce the stigma attached to them.[36] It
follows that the balance between healthier humans and an acceptance of
diversity is becoming an increasingly difficult one to master.[37]
In Mill’s view, ‘actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of
pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.’[38]
This creed is the basis of Jeremy Bentham’s principle of utility on human
nature. Thus, what must be assessed is whether genetically altering a child
with the intention of preventing disease ultimately produces for society more
pleasure or pain? This may appear an overly simplistic question to pose. However,
Mill’s theory comes with an additional caveat: the existence of higher and
lower degrees of pleasure.[39]
Consequently, it may be said that one who selects her child’s characteristics,
raises that child, and ultimately watches her blossom from and into their ideal
extension of themselves experiences an elevated sense of pleasure - far greater
than anything associated with a ‘primitive,’ ‘animalistic,’ or ‘lower’ one. Of
course, the antithetical argument can just as easily be made. One may consider
the unconditional love, compassion and acceptance a parent shows to her
disadvantaged child as more beautiful and rewarding (and ultimately eliciting
more happiness) than a parent who chooses to abort or one who seeks to modify
her child’s genetic makeup with the intention of ‘fixing the problem.’ The latter argument holds true to those
who attribute sanctity to all human life, irrespective of physical or mental
capacity. It holds true for Sandel, who despite his emphasis on appreciating
children as ‘gifts or blessings,’ maintains that the healing of a sick or
injured child “does not override her natural capacities but permits them to
flourish.”[40]
He further adds that medicine has the telos[41]
of restoring and preserving natural human functions that constitute health, and
so no imposition on ‘the given’ can be said to exist in this context. There are
two problems with this. First, one might ask what it might mean to say that
children are gifts, for attributing the gift to nature would be an
anthropomorphism – thereby rendering the idea of a ‘receiver’ and a ‘giver’ as
questionable.[42]
Secondly, Sandel fails to consider the numerous methods in which a child born
with a disease can be treated, without necessarily overriding its natural
capacities. Would a child born with a disease as detrimental to her cognitive
development as PKU[43] be
said to have had her natural capacities overridden by being placed on a special
diet to alleviate the effects of her illness?[44] If
the response is that such a diet would allow her natural capacities to
flourish, what then are we to understand of one’s natural capacities? If “the
given” encompasses all of the child’s natural capacities, can treatment or gene
modification be said to override it? [45]
Having considered the writings of both Sandel and Mill, it appears that neither approach provides a satisfactory
answer to the question of bioengineering of children. Mill’s principles are fundamentally
too general to warrant satisfactory application to this matter, whilst Sandel
makes persuasive arguments against this area of biotechnology without
considering rather flagrant arguments against his position.
This particular area of scientific advancement is something that our
morals are fully grasp. Perhaps as a consequence of this impending sense of power being available to parents, the moral issues raised within
this area of parent-child relationships will cease to bear the significance, or
the emotional weight with which they are argued, in future generations. Humankind
has transformed rapidly over the centuries, leaving thousands of ethically
challenging areas of discussion in its trail. The ethical arguments against
engineering our children are based predominantly on speculative reasoning,
which, much like other historically debated areas, are now debated for the sake
of debate. In other words, we have accepted them and moved on, but debate subsists
regardless. In a world in which the media and
countless other forces play a significant role in shaping the characters of our
children, perhaps parental intervention in this sense should be seen as a step
forward in swaying the pendulum of parental power back towards the parents and not some external force.
Is this opportunity a means through which parents can achieve their idea of what is in their children’s best interest, or will society reject the chance to embrace this advancement through fear of what could happen? That remains to be seen.
Is this opportunity a means through which parents can achieve their idea of what is in their children’s best interest, or will society reject the chance to embrace this advancement through fear of what could happen? That remains to be seen.
[3] Doyle, Lechler, and Turka, 2004
[4] Magnetic Resonance Imaging
[5] Geva, 2006
[6] Gallagher, 2015
[7] Khazan, 2014
[8] Stanley, 2015
[10] Gallagher, 2015
[11] Margo, 2014
[12] Sandel, 2007, p. 5
[13] Savulescu, 2005
[14] Sandel, 2007, p. 9
[15] Ibid., p. 24
[16] A phrase coined and later borrowed from the theologian
William F. May
[17] Sandel, 2007, p. 46
[19] Kahane, 2011
[21] Sandel, 2007, p. 7
[22] Ibid., p. 80
[23] Ibid., p.51
[24] Ibid., p.83
[25] Mill, 1869, p. 113
[27] Ibid., p.121
[28] Waldman, 2013
[29] Preimplantation genetic diagnosis
[30] Naik, 2009 ; Agar, 2006
[31] Catalano, 2012
[32] Keim, 2009
[34] Vallero, 2011
[35] Such as cerebral palsy, cycstic fibrosis or down syndrome;
see further: Abberley, 1987
[36] Harmon, 2005
[37] Ibid.,
[38] Mill, 1863, p. 9-10
[40] Sandel, 2007, p. 46
[41] Aim, purpose or end-goal
[42] Strong, 2005
[43] Phenylketonuria
[44] Lewens, 2009
[45] Ibid.,
