28 December 2014

ba-Ba ba Dook! Dook! Dook!

If it's in a word or it's in a look, you can't get rid of the Babadook.

"I've never seen a more terrifying film than the Babadook, it will scare the hell out of you". Not my words, they're those of William Friedkin, the director of The Exorcist (1973) - a film that is certain to give you a case of urinary incontinence. The Babadook is a special film, indeed. The psychological thriller is directed by Jennifer Kent - a once apprentice of the interesting insular insane infamous Lars von Trier. The film follows Amelia and her six year old son, Sam. His obsession with monsters and increasingly disruptive behaviour both at home and at school forces her to withdraw him, at least until she can deal with the cause of his issues. As she tucks him in one night, he asks his mother to read him a book. The eerie pop-up is a tale about, you guessed it, the Babadook. This rake-thin, Papa Lazarou-like figure is the worst type of monster to be told a story about. He's what you imagine lurking in the darkest corner of your room at night. He's the reason you have those nightmares in which you can't move a single inch of your body. He's everything you fear, and yet he's so much more than that. He's also who Tim Burton hired for his kid's birthday party. As you can imagine, this doesn't do her boy any good. Sam becomes convinced not only of the Babadook's existence, but of his presence in their home - repeatedly shouting "Don't let it in!" The Babadook himself is an embodiment of the fears that children have, and we see how, and to what end, a mother tries to control not only her son's state of mind, but also her own. That's the distinguishing element. That's what makes it different to clichéd, nightcrawlers such as the Boogeyman, where a thing surfaces in the middle of the night and picks them off one by one for no true purpose. What's most appealing about the Babadook is its focus on the relationship between a mother and her child. Her concern for his welfare is what drives her to the edge of insanity, and what makes you wish for her to drive back. Amelia's journey is a long and arduous one; her initial concern slowly becomes frustration, and then manifests into pure, cold, chilling fear. The additional grief and depression and insomnia is what she must endure to ultimately save her son from his trauma. That is the essence of the film.  It is not dependent on moments that give you that brief cardiac arrest sensation, for there actually exists a message within the plot. The viewer is allowed to envisage whatever his/her imagination conjures. Whatever it is that you think, it will leave you aghast, of that there's no doubt. Ultimately, what you take from and understand of Amelia and Sam's experiences is what will really scare you. There are clues in the film's conclusion that suggest the ending you see isn't necessarily the one you should accept. It comes naturally that this interpretation is far less relieving and far more sinister than its alternative.  

10 December 2014

An absolute freedom of expression?

As John Stuart Mill wrote 
“If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in
silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing
mankind”.1 It is submitted that everyone should be free to express their thoughts and
opinions through the mediums of verbal and written communication. These methods cover everything from a conversation between two people on the street to the open-access to any and every website online. There ought not to be any restriction of any degree imposed on the citizens of any society in the world. The arguments hence will be in support of this idea of an absolute freedom of expression, and will consider both utilitarian and libertarian approaches in so doing. It should be noted that this absolute right is not argued for the sake of total anarchy or as a matter of mass unleashing of hateful and abusive verbiage. Rather, it is promoted in the sense of allowing opinions of varying natures to be heard freely, and thus inciting change, development,
reconsideration and/or repeal.

The value of freedom of expression has historically been a paramount component in
the advancement of humanity. Any decision that is made on any level, whether
personal or political, has been preceded by fair consideration and acknowledgement
of a wide array of views, no matter how far-fetched or unfavourable they may have
been. It is said therefore that although no decision will ever be approved
unequivocally, a decision made in this way has a greater chance of being a good
decision, compared to one which has not foregone debate or scrutiny. The principle of
utility, as proposed by Jeremy Bentham, would naturally be in favour of this right. He
wrote “By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to
have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in
question…that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage,
pleasure, good, or happiness, or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or
unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community
in general, then the happiness of the community” 2 adding, “the interest of the
community then is…the sum of the interests of the several members who compose
it.“ 3 An absolute freedom of expression would therefore ultimately lead to the
augmentation of happiness in society, in so far as better decisions being made, which
in the long term are in the greatest interests of the majority.

When this notion enters social, or perhaps practical, realms, it is faced with challenges
that are more deeply problematic. Those against the absolute freedom of expression
would point out the harmful effect it would have, particularly on others’ right to
privacy 4 and right not to be discriminated. 5 It is not submitted that this possibility is
unlikely, and so it is not something that will be disputed. However, this byproduct of
granting the right to absolute freedom of expression is negligible when considered
against the pernicious effect that placing limits on one’s free speech has. Such limits
are widespread, and are more rigorous in certain Middle Eastern countries.
Nations such as Iran label anything on the other side of the ‘line of acceptability’ as: 
unconstitutional, unpatriotic or blasphemous,6 even if what is being expressed would
in Western societies simply constitute somebody’s opinion. This constraint on
people’s expression prevents a fundamental right natural in all of us: the right to
develop ourselves as human beings. As Mill puts it “utility in the largest sense,
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being serves as his basis
of ethical and political theory”.7

When this all-encompassing virtue 8 is considered on a larger scale, what is revealed
is the development of society as a whole, and so what Bentham and Mill argue to be
of paramount importance is what is prohibited. This being society’s ability to progress
to its fullest capabilities. In doing so, it must allow all views to be expressed and
challenged fairly; otherwise pernicious ideas will fester instead of every being
defeated entirely.9 It may be said that a common factor in countries that restrict
expression to such a degree is that they are not democratic, despite them posing as
such. In reality, they are more likely to have totalitarian or dictatorial regimes, which,
like Iran, fool their people into believing that their ‘freedom’ to vote has a bearing on
the end result.10

Conversely, a democratic state may prima facie allow its citizens a much wider scope
of freedom of expression, but there remains a restriction. Considering the previously
mentioned conflict between rights, you or I cannot for example be free to make a joke
about blowing up an airport 11, shout “Fire” in a cinema theatre 12, or write a blog
about how ‘notoriously hideous’ someone is.13 These examples highlight that in a
democracy such as the United Kingdom, there too exists a restriction on expression.
When the general rules of civility and human decency are considered, It would be
unjust to say that all of the above examples are completely acceptable, but the more
important issue at hand boils down to the question of ‘what next’?
It is submitted that once there is a restriction on what is allowed to be said then that
society’s rulers will incrementally grow fonder of the idea of controlling people’s
thoughts, and ultimately lead their people to a dawn of ultra political correctness, ultra
sensitivity to the rights of others, and essentially a society in which people will be
programmed, much like robots, to take from life only what they are commanded to,
leaving them with no ability to criticise, analyse, or discuss these dogmas.
This renders them incapable of progression because they have had ingrained in them,
as generations move on, a mentality which inhibits them from thinking for
themselves. As Benedict de Spinoza once wrote, “the most tyrannical governments
are those which make crimes of opinions, for everyone has an inalienable right over
his thoughts”.14 This notion is something to be avoided at all costs, and if that means
holding an unpopular view then so be it.

It must be said that there is a naturally negative view of disagreement in any sense of
the word. This should not be the case. What an absolute freedom of expression will
enable is opportunity to have a completely open dialogue about absolutely anything.
We would be able to discuss intimately the issues surrounding sensitive and
contentious topics such as religion, race and sex, without fear of authoritative
admonishment or punishment. It would enable us to step out of our comfort zone
when the interests of justice so require.

Further, if everyone is coerced into believing something that is untrue to be true then
this ‘faux-truth’ is a deprivation of an accurate and honest view of the world.
Concurrently, it should never be assumed that something widely regarded as true
actually is true 15, or that it will always be true 16. As John Stuart Mill argues “The
opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those
who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They
have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other
person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are
sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute
certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility”.17 This coercion
may be done through the fear of punishment, or, more worryingly, the degeneration
over time of one’s mind, namely its inquisitive and analytical faculties. It follows that
even though we ought to be free to say anything at all, that does not mean that we
should or would. Principles of civility, our innate ability to know right from wrong 18,
and simple common sense naturally prevent us from saying things that appear unfair,
unreasonable or purely hateful in character.19

From this notion, some libertarians would argue that via the process of selfownership,
one has a right to say anything he so choses. As Robert Nozick wrote
“Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them
(without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they
raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do. How much
room do individual rights leave for the state?” 20 For Nozick, freedom of expression
constitutes one of the inviolable rights we possess as humans. However, there may be
laws prohibiting this on only the most exceptional of grounds, namely ‘protection
against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts…” This position, bearing the
qualification is does, appears to fall short of absolute freedom of expression, yet it
remains much closer to it than is prohibited in certain civilised European nations.21

Furthermore, one may view this right in an alternative light. Murray Rothbard found it
appropriate to consider human rights including that of freedom of expression as
property rights “Freedom of speech is supposed to mean the right of everyone to say
whatever he likes. But the neglected question is: Where? Where does a man have this
right? He certainly does not have it on property on which he is trespassing…he has
this right only either on his own property or on the property of someone who has
agreed…to allow him on the premises…there is no such thing as a separate “right to
free speech”; there is only a man’s property right: the right to do as he wills”.22 Again,
this position does not reconcile completely with the absolute right but goes further
still in advancing the right to complete expression. Rothbard makes the analogy of a
person not necessarily having complete freedom of speech on another’s property, but
rather a right to hire a hall and address people who wish to enter, or the right to
publish his writings and distribute them to whoever is willing to accept it.23 Under
these examples, an absolute freedom of expression appears to have been achieved.

In conclusion, it appears as though the idea of an absolute freedom of expression is
problematic when considered in practical terms. One must consider the possible
conflict it would have with other people’s fundamental rights, and, as such, it
becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile the two. If the idea is evaluated with the
concession that the rights of others will be affected, but in sacrifice of the greater
importance of absolute freedom of expression then a strong argument can be made.
Both the utilitarian and libertarian stances suggest that a claim can indeed be made for
the removal of all restrictions on expression, yet the latter philosophical stance cannot
be said to be in full support, as the essential property rights of others cannot be
ignored. What has always been a controversial area will continue to be so, and what
can be said for certain is that although an absolute freedom does not exist, countries
with much higher levels of tolerance ought to be grateful, for when they compare their
rights to that of countries where speech is heavily restricted, only an ocean of
disparity can be said to exist. As the late Christopher Hitchens once wrote “we may
differ on many things, but what we respect is free inquiry, open-mindedness, and the
pursuit of ideas for their own sake.” 24

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1. Mill, 1859, p.33
2. Bentham, 1780, p.2
3. Bentham, 1780, p.3
4. ECHR, Art.8
5. ECHR, Pro.12
6. Human Rights Watch, 2014
7. Mill, 1859, p.24
8. Containing others such as wisdom, fortitude, justice and perseverance.
9. Joyce, 2007
10. Tavana, 2013
11. s127 Communications Act 2003; see also Chambers v DPP [2012] EWHC 2157
12. R v Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54
13. Albeit someone whose livelihood is dependent on their looks; see Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008
14. de Spinoza, 1883
15. Proof that the world is spherical and not flat; see Ferdinand Magellan’s Voyage Round the World, 1519-1522
16. A once accepted practice/social norm now deemed abhorrent; see Slavery Abolition Act 1833
17. Mill, 1859, p.34
18. Bloom, 2011, p.187; Hitchens, 2007, p.520
19. For example, if x considers y to be to most unattractive, ogre-like woman she has ever seen, it does not automatically follow that she will shout in y’s face with disgust and hatred. It would not even follow that x would quietly whisper in her ear how ugly she is. Things that x will have borne in mind after reaching the conclusion that y is ugly may include: the impact it would have on y, the obvious malicious nature of such a statement, and perhaps even why she would seek to inform y of her view in any case. Thus, x most probably would refrain from saying anything at all, but if, after having considered all of the aforementioned factors, she concludes that she wishes to say it anyway then she must be free to do so without punishment.
20. Nozick, 1974, p.ix
21. ECHR, Art.10
22. Rothbard, 1982, p.190
23. Rothbard, 1982, p.191
24. Hitchens, 2007, p.18